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Introduction  
 
This chapter takes a closer look at the European Union (EU), China, and the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)’s respective approaches to dealing with non-traditional security (NTS) 
challenges by investigating their policies toward Burma/Myanmar—a source country of numerous such 
challenges. It argues that, although all, as members of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), see the need 
for multilateral solutions to fight organized crime, provide disaster relief, combat terrorism, prevent drug 
trafficking, etc., they differ with respect to the steps to be taken to protect human security in Asia-Pacific. 
China, initially hesitant to join the ARF for fear that other members might try to contain it, has come to 
value the principal forum for NTS challenges in the Asia-Pacific region since, like many ASEAN 
countries, it is a big proponent of non-interventionism, non-use of force, consensus decision-making, that 
is, the confidence-building mechanisms commonly referred to as the ‘ASEAN way’.2 The EU, as a strong 
proponent of human rights and the rule of law, repeatedly, has criticized ARF members for allowing 
sovereignty-related norms to get in the way of the protection of human rights, but it has refrained from 
assuming the role of norm exporter. As will be seen in the case of Burma/Myanmar, the EU does make its 
opinions heard and, when necessary, will take unilateral steps not supported by the ASEAN members of 
the ARF but, cognizant of the history of the region, for the most part, settles for supporting economic 
development and aiding in capacity-building, understanding that it would be counter-productive to exert 
pressure on reluctant ARF members to modify the non-interference norm. The chapter then speculates 
about the ‘ASEAN way’s’ longevity, arguing that, increasingly, there are internal and external dynamics 
that seem to indicate that the ‘ASEAN way,’ at least in its current form, may not be here to stay. The 
conclusion looks at what might be in store for Burma/Myanmar in the years to come.  
 
 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)
3
 
 
Since a sizable literature concerning ASEAN and, by extension, the ARF already exists (Frost 
1990; Leifer 1996; Narine 2002; Acharya 2003; Weber 2009; Weber 2011, Weber 2013), I will keep my 
discussion of the ARF’s history brief and summarize the organization’s main objectives, goals, principles, 
and performance to date. At the end of the Cold War, ASEAN, like many other international 
organizations, was not immune to changes in its external environment. New transnational challenges 
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(terrorism, maritime security, human and drug trafficking, environmental disasters, refugee flows, etc.), 
greater uncertainty regarding the behavior of the Great Powers in the region, and the fear of US 
isolationism necessitated a reassessment of existing security provisions. ASEAN concluded that it should 
expand its focus by creating a new multilateral arrangement—the ARF—to deal with external as well as 
internal threats.                                                         
It was clear from the outset that ASEAN members sought to complement their bilateral alliances 
with the US by using ASEAN’s own model of cooperative security as a framework for promoting peace. 
Having to operate in a significantly changed international environment where unilateral action clearly 
would be insufficient and bilateralism risky,‘[ASEAN’s] underlying goal,’ as Leifer (1996: 19) put it, 
‘was to create the conditions for a stable … distribution of power among the three major Asia-Pacific 
states – China, Japan and the United States – that would benefit regional order.’ After careful 
deliberations in July 1993, the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and Post Ministerial Conference agreed 
to create the ARF.                                                             
The inaugural meeting of the ARF was held in Bangkok on 25 July 1994. Its founders 
conceptualized the organization as the principal forum for security cooperation in the region, which, via 
the dissemination of specific rules and norms, they hoped would promote trust, peace and prosperity and 
allow them to confront trans-national challenges. Comprised of 27 countries,
4
 the ARF is based on 
ASEAN-style diplomacy, that is, it relies on non-interference in internal affairs, non-use of force, pacific 
settlement of disputes, consensus decision-making, and ‘good neighbourliness’ as main principles of 
action. The ARF has a strong preference for non-binding and non-legalistic approaches and displays 
minimal institutionalization, thus setting it apart from European security structures.   
 As Katsumata (2006: 194) explains, the ‘ARF is not designed to “resolve” … disputes’. It 
therefore could not prevent conflicts between its members such as the diplomatic row between South 
Korea and Japan over Dokdo/Takeshima, China’s military intimidation in the Taiwan Strait, territorial 
disputes regarding the Spratlys in the South China Sea, or disagreements concerning water utilization in 
the Mekong River Basin, to name but a few.    
Rather than settling disputes, the ARF seeks to promote lasting peace by utilizing confidence-
building mechanisms (CBMs) to create trust among its members. In other words, the ARF is about 
‘identity-building’ and its members hope that ‘dialogue should lead to socialization which, in turn, will 
lead to the dissipation of conflicts of interests’ (Garofano 1999: 78). Comprehensive engagement and 
political dialogue, from the ARF’s perspective, are the correct way to foster peace, not the dispatch of 
troops (Leifer 1996:  46). Thus, during its first ten years, the ARF largely held workshops with the main 
purpose of disseminating the ‘ASEAN way’ (non-use of force, non-interference in domestic affairs, etc.), 
thereby earning the label of a ‘norm brewery’ (Katsumata 2006: 195).     
 In their efforts to promote peace, the ASEAN members of the ARF seek to retain control over the 
organization. They do this by making sure that ASEAN states provide the venue for the ARF’s annual 
meetings. Moreover, they insist that inter-sessional study groups, which are composed of two states, 
always include an ASEAN member. Also, they mandate that the ASEAN consensus principle always 
prevails (Simon 2007: 22). The bottom line for the ARF, as for ASEAN, is to protect the sovereignty of 
its members and to uphold the fundamental principles outlined in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. It 
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is important to understand, however, that the ARF is split between activist (Australia, Canada, US, Japan, 
EU) and reluctant (China and most of ASEAN) members. ASEAN countries reject a more formal ARF 
because they want to avoid taking any steps that would undermine the ‘ASEAN way’. China, similarly, 
rejects greater formality because it opposes interference in its domestic affairs (particularly regarding 
Taiwan and the South China Sea). Hence a ‘pace comfortable to all participants’ needs to be found, 
which, as will be seen in the case of Myanmar, often undermines the effectiveness of the ARF. 
 Since any type of institutionalization, by definition, entails some curtailment of freedom of action 
and most ARF members remain hesitant to restrict their autonomy, the organization has purposely been 
kept ‘under-institutionalised’. For the most part, the ARF has concentrated on exchanging views among 
its members and, from 1994 to 2009, has held 27 Inter-Sessional Support Group meetings on CBMs, as 
well as more than 150 inter-sessional, regional and expert meetings on topics such as peacekeeping; 
search, rescue and disaster relief; defense; counter-terrorism; and maritime security – all to promote trust 
(ARF 2012). Additionally, for the period 1994–2004, Track I activities were complemented by 68 Track 
II activities dealing with such issues as regional security, trans-national crime, non-proliferation regimes 
and the Korean peninsula (ARF 2009).         
 With respect to performance, in their 1995 Concept Paper the ARF members envisioned a ‘three-
stage, evolutionary approach (…) moving from confidence building to preventive diplomacy and, in the 
long term, towards a conflict resolution capability’ (ARF 1995: 1). Thus far, the ARF has largely made 
progress in confidence building. Since it took the organization until 2005 to declare that it was time to 
move into the preventive diplomacy (PD) stage, efforts to develop PD mechanisms are underdeveloped, 
and conflict management is non-existent.        
When it comes to confidence-building, the ARF seeks to disseminate the norms and rules 
associated with the ‘ASEAN way’. Given that the region has experienced tremendous bloodshed in the 
20th century and that there are still cultural, ethnic, religious and historical differences to overcome, the 
goal is to promote trust via CBMs and bring about peace and prosperity. On the one hand, the ARF seeks 
to build confidence by endorsing the principles of ‘good neighbourliness’. On the other hand, the 
organization seeks to implement specific CBMs such as Defense White Papers, arms registers, high level 
visits, and disclosure of arms exports for which it has designed a specific timetable (see ARF 2006: 6–9). 
Even though the ARF has held numerous meetings to promote stability and has recently become 
more outspoken when members engage in undesirable behavior, it still lacks teeth. A case in point is its 
interactions with Burma/Myanmar. As will be discussed below, even though a number of ARF members 
expressed their deep concern about the situation in Burma/Myanmar, called for the release of all political 
prisoners, urged the country to make ‘meaningful and expeditious progress towards democratic reform 
and national reconciliation’ (ARF 2008a), the ARF goes no further than that and stays clear of policing 
missions, providing post-conflict reconstruction or peace-building.   
As expressly stated in the Co-Chair’s Summary Report of the ARF Workshop on ‘Confidence 
Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy in Asia and Europe’, 12–14 March 2008 in Berlin, the 
ARF is ‘currently in the transition phase from confidence building to preventive diplomacy’ (ARF 
2008d). The document explains that ‘[a]s mutual trust amongst ASEAN countries … and ARF 
participants had increased, the ARF was in a good position to advance into preventive diplomacy’ (ibid.: 
1). Steps to enhance CBMs and PD might include the improvement of communication between ARF 
participants, information exchange mechanisms, and the creation of a crisis room or some other form of 
early warning mechanism (ibid.).  
Since its inception, the ARF, for instance, has held numerous Disaster Relief Desk-top Exercises 
which entail simulations of a series of fictitious natural disasters (cyclones, earthquakes, tsunamis, etc.) to 
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develop Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and to discuss the improvement of military-to-military 
and civilian–military coordination among ARF members (ARF 2007a). In the area of protection, only 
modest progress has been made, due to the norm of non-interference and the ARF members’ hesitancy to 
curtail their autonomy. The ARF recognizes the need to protect society from threats caused by organized 
crime, terrorism, the spread of infectious diseases, and so on, but, so far, has not moved much beyond the 
discussion stage. It has, for example, conducted Roundtables on Maritime Security, mainly concluding 
that it is time to move from discussion to the implementation of concrete measures (ARF 2007b). The 
ARF also has moved towards greater defense cooperation, but ‘the need for capacity building through 
joint training and information sharing’ still exists (ARF 2008c: 1–2).    
In recent years, the ARF has made some progress regarding counter-terrorism. It has called upon 
its members to become parties to international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism (ARF 
2012a), stressed the need for cooperation among regional organizations like ASEAN, Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC), Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) and the ARF in the area of counter-
terrorism, and addressed measures like bilateral agreements, intelligence exchanges, information sharing, 
law enforcement cooperation, and mutual legal assistance to fight trans-national crime more effectively 
(ibid.; also see Yuzawa 2006: 800; Simon 2007: ix). However, the bottom line for ARF members is that 
proposals need further reflection, since they would lead to the creation of permanent mechanisms that 
could undermine the ‘ASEAN way’.  
Since the ‘prime model for the ARF is ASEAN’s own distinctive, political approach to regional 
security problems,’ as Leifer (1996: 3) aptly put it, ‘conspicuously absent from the ARF is any robust 
provision for addressing the use of force in conflict and conflict resolution’. Military intervention, 
peacemaking, peace-enforcement or any other military instruments are clearly outside the purview of the 
ARF, which consciously elects to rely exclusively on political and economic means. This lack of ‘teeth’, 
according to Leifer (1996: 53), renders the ARF an ‘imperfect diplomatic instrument for achieving 
regional security goals’. Nonetheless, in 2008 there were signs that the ARF might soon be ready to set 
itself more ambitious goals and consider undertaking preventive actions in addition to preventive 
diplomacy. During its second Peacekeeping Experts’ Meeting in Singapore, 4–6 March 2008, the 
organization discussed the possibility of future participation in peacekeeping operations and called for 
‘enhanced quality in training, the right equipment and the necessary political will’ (ARF 2008b: 4). The 
Japanese government, moreover, offered cooperation with peacekeeping training centers in the Asian 
region.
5
 Those countries not ready to contribute forces, it was noted, could aid in other ways by providing 
health and medical services, military advisers and combat service support forces (ibid.).  
 
Divergent views of sovereignty and the importance of norms 
 
Although the EU, China and ASEAN countries all see a need for tackling human security issues 
multilaterally, the EU is more willing to curtail its autonomy than the latter two who fiercely protect their 
freedom of action. How can this divergence in views be explained?     
 In general, two main reasons have been given as to why others embrace certain ‘standards of 
behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations’, that is, norms (Krasner 1983: 2). On the one hand, as 
rational choice proponents make clear, there are material reasons. Scholars in this camp suggest that 
‘domestic actors follow norms because they want to maximize their individual utility and decrease the 
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cost of non-compliance, that is, these scholars employ a logic of ‘conditionality’ (Kelly 2004). On the 
other hand, there are constructivists who use a ‘logic of appropriateness’ to account for the diffusion of 
norms—they argue that ‘actors follow norms for intrinsic reasons such as personal dispositions informed 
by social belief’ (Kelly 2004 quoted in Dominguez 2010: 5; also see Susanto 2011). And, of course, there 
may be a combination of material and normative reasons.    
Norms then are tools with which to shape policy. They emerge as a result of a persuasion effort 
carried by ‘norm entrepreneurs’ (De Carolis 2010: 73). The EU, labeled a ‘normative power’ on account 
of its strong support for human rights and the rule of law (Treaty on European Union, Article 6 [see 
European Union 1992]; European Security Strategy [see European Council 2003]; Manners 2002; Diez 
and Manners 2007), may be tempted to export human rights-related norms. Yet, as will become clear 
when taking a closer look at its policies vis-à-vis Burma/Myanmar, the EU exercises self-restraint and, 
although it issued sanctions (negative incentives), largely continues to support economic development as 
well as capacity-building projects (positive incentives) to address NTS challenges in the region.
6
 
What needs to be kept in mind is that there are two sides to the norms story. It is not only the 
dissemination of norms that matters, but their reception and reinterpretation (Capie 2007). As Rueland 
and Bechle (2011: 3) explain, ‘[t]he belief that external norm entrepreneurs may induce norm recipients to 
fully change deeply entrenched beliefs and world views is an overly optimistic assumption ... . It is driven 
by the Western-centrism ... of mainstream modernization theory and attaches agency primarily to the 
external norm entrepreneurs.’ Recent empirical evidence by scholars like Capie (2007) and Acharya 
(2009) suggests that such a view ignores agency on the part of the norm recipients. ‘Much more than 
being passive norm-takers, they may completely reject new ideas, adopt them rhetorically or amalgamate 
them with existing ideas’. Typically, Acharya (2009: 21) goes on to say, there is an ‘existing set of ideas, 
beliefs, systems, and norms which determine[s] and condition[s] an individual or social group’s 
receptivity to new norms’—a ‘cognitive prior’.  
For ASEAN countries, ‘non-intervention resonated strongly with the prior norms of anti-
colonialism and anti-power politics held by Asian leaders’ (Acharya 2009: 61).  Hence, ‘while localizing 
non-intervention, [these countries] not only enhanced their prior anti-colonial norms and identity as 
independent actors, they also gave an extended and expanded meaning to the non-intervention norm in the 
regional context’ (Acharya 2009: 68). As Katanyuu (2006: 826-7) emphasizes, ASEAN countries 
‘continue to be plagued by interstate disputes, internal subversion, and moves to secede. Neighbors 
suspect each other of bolstering domestic ethnic or separatist groups to foment secession.
7
 Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Thailand today still face elements of domestic insurgency or 
extremism. In principle, ... interference would provide an avenue for a country’s neighbors to aid such 
insurgents. This would undermine a member’s territorial integrity and national security.’ Rather than to 
blindly adopt outside beliefs, norms and values, local actors ‘through discourse, framing, grafting, and 
cultural selection’ purposely modify foreign ideas such that they become ‘congruen[t] with local beliefs 
and practices’, a process which Acharya (2009: 15) labels ‘constitutive localization’. Case in point the 
reframing of the transnational small arms norm to make it congruent with ASEAN’s constitutive norms—
the non-intervention in the domestic affairs of others and the protection of sovereignty (see Capie 2007: 
5). It therefore does not suffice to look merely at how foreign ideas impact the norm-takers, but how the 
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latters’ ‘cognitive priors ... influenc[e] the reshaping and reception of these external ideas’ (Acharya 
2009: 136).    
Since, as Rueland and Bechle (2011: 4-5) remind us, ‘localization tends to occur when the 
external norm entrepreneurs find vocal allies within the recipient society or organization and when [the 
local government] increase[s] its international respectability [and] strengthen[s] its domestic legitimacy’, 
the ‘transformative power’ of the EU is limited (Dominguez 2010: 3). Aside from the fact that ‘Europe is 
not the principal determiner of what is “normal” in global affairs’ (Wood 2011: 246), when non-European 
countries reject its normative agenda, the EU, ‘conscious of business, public and strategic interests’ (ibid.: 
243), tends to exercise self-restraint, rather than to insist on being a norm exporter. This does not prevent 
the EU from emphasizing the importance of protecting human rights and the rule of law. It has done so 
for years and, as can be seen during a recent summit meeting with China (see European Council 2012: 
Article 6), continues this practice. And yet, as long as countries like Russia or China behave peacefully 
toward it, Europe seems to be content without insisting on these countries adopting ‘Europe’s liberal 
democratic values’ (Schieder 2009 quoted in Wood 2011: 249), thereby seriously undermining its human 
rights dialogue.    
China, a big proponent of the ‘ASEAN way’ (Xinbo 2009), much like many ASEAN members of 
the ARF, appears to be largely unimpressed by ‘normative power Europe’. In fact, it seldom misses an 
opportunity to remind Europe that sovereignty-related norms must be upheld in Europe’s dealings with 
China, even when they get in the way of the protection of human rights. Similarly, China goes out of its 
way to stress that non-intervention is non-negotiable. Unlike EU members who view sovereignty as a 
qualitative measure, that is, a country either is ‘constitutionally independent’ or it is not (James 1986: 30-
48), like the ASEAN members of the ARF, China appears to view sovereignty in quantitative terms. In 
fact, it seems to equate it with ‘formal power’, political independence’ or ‘freedom of action’—measures 
a state can have more or less of (Weber 2012).
8
 Thus, not surprisingly, like many ASEAN countries, 
China rejects Western universalism and takes every opportunity it gets to stress the need to respect 
sovereignty and diversity. 
 
Burma/Myanmar: Main political developments since independence 
 
Burma/Myanmar is a multi-ethnic state with one of the longest-running civil wars in history 
where, to this day, different ethnic groups fight for autonomy. Colonized by Britain in three Anglo-
Burmese Wars (1824-1885), the country gained independence from the British Empire following 
negotiations in 1947 by Aung San, founder of the modern Burmese army. Upon his assassination by 
political rivals in July of the same year, on 4 January 1948, Sao Shwe Thaik became the first president of 
the independent Union of Burma. Multi-party elections were held on three separate occasions (1951-
1952, 1956 and 1960) and, on 2 March 1962 ‘the military took power in a political coup ... under the Ne 
Win regime (Petersson 2006: 568). Military rule lasted until general elections in 2010 brought a civilian 
government to power.         
Characterized as a ‘modern-day hermit kingdom’ (…) from the 1960s to the late 1980s Burma 
was one of the most closed societies in the world’ (Bunyanunda 2002: 118-120). For decades it has also 
been know for one of the most horrendous human rights records in the world, where people were ‘forced 
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into labor by the military’ (Petersson 2006: 568), where peasants had to walk ahead of army troops ‘when 
booby traps or ambushes were expected’ (Bunyanunda 2002: 121), and where the regime used brute force 
to suppress protests against military rule.       
By the end of the 1980s the country confronted economic ruin and, Aung San’s daughter, Aung 
San Suu Kyi, gave rise to a new political movement to improve living conditions and promote democracy 
and civil rights (Petersson 2006: 568). ‘From March through September of 1988, Burmese pro-democracy 
protesters took to the streets in several cities around the country’ (Bunyanunda 2002: 118), and more than 
3000 protesters were killed in what became known as the 8-8-88 Uprising. The Burmese military not only 
crushed the protests, but ‘usher[ed] in a new era of repression under the State Law and Order Restoration 
Council or SLORC—a junta’ (ibid.) which changed the country’s name to the Union of Myanmar. 
 In free elections SLORC promised for May 1990, Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for 
Democracy (NLD) badly defeated the military junta at the polls, resulting in her being placed under house 
arrest and thousands of her supporters being jailed. The pro-democracy leader would spend 15 of the 
following 21 years under arrest. SLORC continued to exist until 1997, and then was replaced by the State 
Peace and Development Council (SPDC) which lasted until March 2011.     
 Since the crackdown on pro-democracy protesters in 1988, the UN General Assembly has passed 
numerous resolutions deploring the situation in the country and calling for change. Beginning in 1995, 
special envoys and human rights rapporteurs have made regular visits to Burma/Myanmar and, upon 
continuous urging by the US since 2004, the UN Security Council, on 15 September 2006, formally 
placed Burma/Myanmar on its agenda (International Crisis Group 2008: 6). Due to serious objections 
from China and Russia, however, a US/UK draft resolution calling on the Burmese government to ‘cease 
military attacks against civilians in ethnic minority regions (...), permit international humanitarian 
organizations to operate without restrictions (...), to begin without delay a substantive political dialogue’ 
(see European Council 2012a: 2), on 12 January 2007, became subject to a Sino-Russian veto. 
Given that the country is one of the most impoverished in the world, and that most resources have 
been used to support the military, it does not come as a surprise that an unannounced hike in fuel prices 
on 15 August 2007 led to protest marches. Whereas, initially, mainly NLD members, social activists and 
student leaders took to the streets, when monks from a small town southwest of Mandalay joined in the 
protests and were brutally ‘beaten by pro-government vigilantes’, in the weeks that followed, daily 
marches took place in Yangon and from there spread to a couple dozen other towns (International Crisis 
Group 2008: 2). On the evening of 25 September the government imposed a curfew and, during the next 
night, ‘troops raided several monasteries, beat up monks and dragged several hundred off to special 
detention centres’ (ibid.: 3). On account of this brutal crackdown, the army’s standing suffered 
irreparable harm and, as will be seen below, ultimately, a combination of domestic and international 
pressure played a critical role in bringing about a relaxation of tensions between the government and its 
political opposition. What will also become clear is that there were stark differences between the response 
of the Western countries, China and the ASEAN members of the ARF and, at times, even differences 
within regions. Fast forwarding to October 2010, although an announcement was made that Aung San 
Suu Kyi may be released prior to what were to be the first Burmese general elections in nearly 20 years, 
the government decided that she would not be allowed to run, but promised that she would be released on 
13 November 2010. Days after the junta-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) won 
the election, Aung San Suu Kyi finally regained her freedom. In January 2012, she became a contestant in 
special parliamentary elections and, on 1 April 2012, won a seat in Parliament.      
What the above synopsis of Burma/Myanmar makes readily apparent is that we are dealing with 
one of the poorest countries in the world which has experienced civil war for several decades and which is 
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plagued by a host of NTS challenges. Due to continued fighting in the border regions, Burma/Myanmar’s 
neighbors are subject to significant refugee flows and, short of any major improvement in the country’s 
human rights record as well as economic/social conditions, this situation is unlikely to change. Moreover, 
neighboring countries have to content with drug-trafficking (Burma/Myanmar is the world’s second-
largest producer of illicit opium [see US Department of State 2007: 5]), the spread of infectious diseases 
like HIV/AIDS, and fear that ethnic conflict may spill across borders and that secessionist movements 
may infect their own populations.  
 
The EU’s relations with Southeast Asia and Burma/Myanmar 
 
Relations between Europe and Southeast Asia, as Petersson (2006: 563) makes clear, have been 
‘long and complex’. In the past century alone, Southeast Asians experienced colonialism, then saw de-
colonization and, toward the latter part of the century, significant economic aid from the European 
Community as well as enhanced commercial ties with Europe (ibid.).     
 Starting in July 1994, the EU codified its Asia policy in a series of Commission documents (see 
Weber 2013) which it periodically modified until it came up with a master plan for 2007-2012. In a 
nutshell, these documents recommend for the EU to play a pro-active role in regional cooperation via the 
ARF and inter-regional dialogues via the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) (Commission 2001: 3). A Plan of 
Action, moreover, proposes to ‘deepen security cooperation’, especially when it comes to ‘crisis 
management, conflict prevention, and capacity building’ (Commission 2007: 1-2).    These 
documents suggest that the EU understands that it is more likely to make meaningful contributions to 
Asian security by continuing to support economic development, sharing its experiences with regional 
cooperative efforts, providing tools, independent monitors, and aiding in capacity-building. Or, put 
differently, the EU realizes that insisting on improved human rights and democracy promotion in 
Southeast Asia—being a norm exporter—would lead to opposition and thus make it more difficult to 
achieve the EU’s goal of enhancing security in the region. Given differences in values, norms and culture 
between Europe and Asia, and the fact that ‘the issue of fundamental human rights, the promotion of 
democracy and good governance constitute core objectives in [the EU’s] external relations ... with third 
countries’ (Petersson 2006: 564), however, it does not always manage to steer clear of incorporating 
human rights clauses in cooperation agreements with ASEAN countries.       
 According to De Flers (2010: 3), human rights played ‘a marginal role at best in official EC-
ASEAN relations until the late 1980s’. Also, by the early 1990s, ASEAN-EU trade was growing more 
rapidly than ASEAN’s trade with its largest partner—Japan (Petersson 2006: 573). Then, political 
relations between Europe and Southeast Asia began to become strained.     
 As a result of the phenomenal changes in Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s—the fall of 
the Berlin Wall, the disintegration of the Soviet empire, and the move toward democratic governments 
and free market economies by many Central and East European countries—the EU not only began to 
include human rights and democracy clauses in its relations with its new neighbors to the East and South 
(Weber, Smith and Baun 2007), but, also insisted on including such clauses in its cooperation agreements 
with ASEAN (De Flers 2010: 2). Trade and economic aid became linked to human rights and 
democratization issues, that is, the EU began to pursue a policy of ‘conditionality’ (ibid.: 3).       
Not surprisingly, the Southeast Asian countries regarded these demands by the EC/EU as 
interference in their domestic affairs, and thus, as unacceptable. This prompted a group of ASEAN states 
to begin what became known as the ‘Asian values’ debate, in which they outlined their own position 
towards human rights. More specifically these countries argue that ‘human rights are enmeshed in 
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cultures, social structures and traditions’, and thus outright reject ‘Western universalism with regard to 
human rights standards’ (De Flers 2010: 4; Clifford 2011). Interestingly, in addition to respect for the 
individual, many Asians include ‘the obligation by that individual to the society and the state’ as a 
fundamental component of human rights (Petersson 2006: 577). To lend greater emphasis to their 
position, many Asian countries, additionally, make use of every opportunity to remind ‘Western 
democracies [that they] themselves showed little concern for human rights before they became 
political[ly] stable (ibid.: 577-9), thus accusing them of double-standards.      
 In 1997 two ‘cataclysmic’ events took place that worsened the relationship between the EU and 
Asian countries further, namely, Burma/Myanmar’s entry into ASEAN and the Asian financial crisis. As 
a direct response to Burma’s membership in ASEAN, ‘the EU temporarily suspended its formal dialogue 
with the Association’ (Bunyanunda 2002: 131). The EU was so upset with this new development that it 
‘expanded its existing visa ban on Burmese government officials in October 1998, ... suspended the 
Generalized Scheme of Preferences ... for Burma, [and] initiated an arms embargo’ (ibid.).      
 Without a doubt, the Burmese military junta’s human rights abuses and, as will be seen below, 
the defense of such abuses by the other ASEAN countries under invocation of the ‘ASEAN way’ have 
‘soured the relations between the two regions’ (Petersson 2006: 564) and contributed to the failure of an 
EU-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement that was being negotiated at the time (see EU Center Singapore 
2012). Rather than trying to engage Burmese military leaders, as several ASEAN members of the ARF 
have done—maintaining that Burma’s human rights record and political instability were internal matters 
not subject to regional interference (De Flers 2010: 5)—the EU decided to ignore ASEAN members’ 
wishes and impose sanctions.
9
 This was not without risk since the latter could have had positive as well as 
negative consequences. Clearly, the EU hoped that sanctions would bring the Burmese government to its 
knees, but they could have also caused Burmese citizens to ‘rally around the flag’ (see Bunyanunda 2002: 
134).  And, there was the possibility that other countries, like China, might fill the void. It took the EU 
and ASEAN to come up with ‘an implicit bargain’, as De Flers (2010: 6) explains, which involved a 
promise by Burma/Myanmar to ‘lift restrictions on the National League for Democracy (NLD) and accept 
a visit by the EU Troika’ (Jones 2008: 277), to resolve the impasse in EU-ASEAN relations and, in 2000, 
resume ministerial meetings. What one finds, however, is that each time there were particularly serious 
human rights violations in Burma/Myanmar, the EU renewed its sanctions and thought of additional 
restrictive measures to punish the junta.   
To sum up, even though the EU is cognizant of the history of the region, fundamental ‘differences 
in values, norms and culture between Europe and Asia’ remain and are apparent with respect to the issue 
of how to deal with Burma/Myanmar (De Flers 2010: 1). Although the EU makes its opinions heard and 
has imposed a number of sanctions on members of the Burmese junta and their associates, ultimately, it 
prefers an approach that consists of a mix of carrots and sticks (International Crisis Group 2008: 16). By 
also concentrating on economic development, capacity building and cooperation with respect to non-
traditional security threats—that is, providing positive incentives—the EU seeks to prevent its normative 
priorities and sticks in the form of sanctions from undermining its security goals. It understands that by 
strengthening Southeast Asia it will help to balance against an increasingly powerful and assertive China, 
thereby leaving both partners better off.       
    
                                                     
9
 Among the measures taken the EU instituted a visa ban for high-ranking officials (mostly members of the military 
junta and their associates), froze their assets, suspended non-humanitarian aid, and banned the export of equipment 
and technology for the timber and gems industries (see Buente and Portela 2012: 4-5). 
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China’s relations with Southeast Asia and Burma/Myanmar 
 
Contrary to what we have observed in the case of Europe, the relationship between China and 
most Southeast Asian countries, historically, has seen little conflict and, throughout much of the Cold 
War, these countries, for the most part, ‘[did] not feel any direct concrete threat to their existence by 
China’ (Tang 2010: 64). Moreover, close to 28 million Chinese live in South East Asia today and, as 
Tang (65) explains, this ‘diaspora ... control[s] a large portion of these countries’ wealth’ (ibid.). And 
China is one of the top trading partners of these countries.      
 Yet, due to increased military spending by China in the mid-1990s, provocative military exercises 
in the Taiwan Strait in 1996, attempts to project its power beyond its borders and assert ownership of 
contested territory in the South China Sea and the Mekong River Basin, this largely positive perception of 
China became more nuanced. On the one hand, the rise of China is viewed as a great opportunity, a ‘new 
engine of growth for the entire region’ (Banlaoi 2003: 99). On the other hand, it brings great uncertainty 
and feelings of insecurity.            As 
already mentioned, when China joined the ARF in 1994, it was concerned that the US, Japan and the 
Southeast Asian countries, viewing China at least as a potential threat due to its growing power, might use 
the ARF to contain China (Xinbo 2009: 56). Another concern was that the ARF might seek to address 
territorial disputes in the South China Sea, an issue Beijing was hoping to deal with on a bilateral basis 
with various Southeast Asian countries. After all, if the ARF were to place the South China Sea issue on 
its agenda, China feared, ‘disputants such as Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam might form a united 
front against China’ which other Southeast Asian countries ‘and possibly the United States and Japan 
might join’ (Xinbo 2009: 56).    
Since neither happened,
10
 China has become more comfortable with regional security cooperation 
and, concerned about security and stability on its periphery (terrorism, separatism, extremism), has sought 
to strengthen its ties with its neighbors. Thus, whereas regional multilateralism in the 1980s was viewed 
as potentially hazardous, China, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, began to perceive it as a useful tool to 
beef up its security and to increase its influence in the region (ibid.: 58). Although China prefers ASEAN 
Plus Three (APT)—an arrangement composed of the 10 ASEAN countries plus China, Japan and South 
Korea—to the ARF,11 since the former keeps India, Australia, New Zealand and the US out of the 
negotiations, it does acknowledge the ARF’s role in building trust and fostering habits of cooperation, a 
non-trivial accomplishment.    
When it comes to policy vis-à-vis Burma/Myanmar, ‘there is a clash of interest between the West 
and China ... [Whereas] the West regards intervention towards Myanmar as a humanitarian issue, ... China 
considers ... [it] an issue about their image, position and commitments to neighboring countries’ (Li and 
Zheng 2009: 630-1). Rejecting any outside interference in its domestic affairs—such as criticism of its 
own human rights record—China, not surprisingly, has seen eye-to-eye with Burma/Myanmar when it 
                                                     
10
 Although, recently, there have been rising tensions over competing territorial claims in the South China Sea and 
these tensions were high on the priority list of the ARF’s Foreign Ministers meeting in Cambodia on 11-12 July 
2012, there were sharp divisions among the ASEAN countries so that, for the first time in the ARF’s 45-year 
history, there was no agreement on a final communiqué. At the same time, a planned Code of Conduct (CoC) for the 
South China Sea between ASEAN and China ran into problems, when the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and 
Brunei—all claimants in the dispute—failed to reach agreement among themselves. For a more detailed discussion 
of these tensions see, Storey (2012). 
 
11
 As will become clear below, the ASEAN countries prefer the ARF because it puts them in the driver’s seat and 
makes it possible for the US to balance against China. 
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comes to sovereignty-related issues and, for many years, has been a strong supporter of the SLORC.  
 In addition to ideological commonalities, China has significant security and commercial interests 
in Burma/Myanmar. Viewing the latter as ‘part of its strategic landscape’ (McCarthy 2008: 928), ‘China 
is reported to have supplied more than $1.5 billion worth of military aid in the form of radar equipment, 
patrol boats, heavy artillery, tanks, anti-aircraft missiles, fighter aircraft, guns and munitions’ 
(Bunyanunda 2002: 128-9). In creating a symbiotic relationship with Burma/Myanmar, China hopes to 
not only gain from trade—to date it has heavily invested in ‘telecommunications, mining, automotive, 
aviation, and oil industries’ and thereby become Burma/Myanmar’s largest trade partner (Bunyanunda 
2002: 129)—but also to obtain access to the Indian Ocean and to ‘develop its poverty-stricken inland 
western provinces’ (International Crisis Group 2008: 8-9).  
Largely concerned with tackling drug smuggling, AIDS, cross-border gambling, illegal 
immigration, i.e., NTS challenges, as well as ‘keeping a free transport corridor in the Indochina Peninsula 
and a buffer at China’s frontier’, according to Li and Zheng (2009: 633-6), China has adopted a policy of 
‘soft interventions’ vis-à-vis Burma/Myanmar. These, we learn, can take two forms: ‘cross-border 
intervention and diplomatic intervention’ (ibid.: 633). Whereas the former includes activities such as 
‘joint anti-drug operations’ or ‘China’s legal actions against ... casino[s] in Myanmar’, the latter entails 
‘Chinese efforts to encourage Myanmar to break international isolation, to pressure the Myanmar military 
government during the period of mass demonstration and to facilitate the UN special envoy’s visit in 
Myanmar’ (ibid.). This policy, therefore, clearly sets China apart from the West. When the US and the EU 
imposed sanctions against the military junta in Burma/Myanmar, and the UN Security Council repeatedly 
called for national reconciliation, China, like Russia, protected Burma/Myanmar by casting a veto against 
UNSC Draft Resolution S/2007/14-12/01/2007), ‘argu[ing] that the situation did not constitute a threat to 
regional or international peace’ (Wouters and Burnay 2011: 12; Haacke 2010: 159).   
 In sum, what China shares with the West is its increasing concern about non-traditional security 
challenges that threaten human security.  It also acknowledges that unilateral action will not be able to get 
the job done and that regional cooperation is needed to make progress in this area. Moreover, China 
seems to recognize that the EU, on account of its long history of regional cooperation and experience in 
addressing NTS challenges, may be able to provide useful lessons for the ARF. Where China and the EU 
differ is in their treatment of Burma/Myanmar. Although China benefits from the status quo, it recognizes 
that further instability in Burma/Myanmar could lead to the exodus of ‘more than one million Chinese 
nationals who...have settled in Myanmar, thus closing an important safety valve for socio-political 
pressure in China itself’ (International Crisis Group 2008: 9). As a strong proponent of non-interference 
in domestic affairs, and a country that has been used to playing the ‘sovereignty card’ for as many years 
as it has made use of the ‘history card’ (Weber and Huang 2010), China exercises much greater leniency 
toward Burma/Myanmar than the West. Its soft interventionism—consisting largely of ‘nudg[ing] the 
military leadership towards better governance and policy reform’ (International Crisis Group 2008: 9) and 
opposition to sanctions—not surprisingly, has been criticized time and again by the US and the EU (as 
well as Australia and Japan), but has fared much better with many ASEAN members of the ARF.   
 
ASEAN countries’ policies vis-à-vis Burma/Myanmar 
 
ASEAN, and since its inception also the ARF, time and again, have been accused of being willing 
to look the other way in the face of severe human rights violations. To name but a few examples, ASEAN 
did not take any action against ‘Indonesia’s 1975 invasion and 1999 human rights violations in East 
Timor, ... severe human rights violations against Muslims in Southern Thailand during the Thaksin era, 
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[and] repeated crackdowns on pro-democracy activists and ethnic minorities in Burma’ (Rahim 2008: 71). 
 Yet, one needs to be careful not to lump all ASEAN countries in the same category. At least in 
part due to their political heterogeneity—Cambodia, Burma, Vietnam and Laos are authoritarian states; 
Malaysia and Singapore are semi-authoritarian; Brunei is an absolute monarchy; Indonesia, Thailand and 
the Philippines are unconsolidated democracies (Rahim 2008)—some members are more willing to curtail 
their political autonomy than others. Typically, the more democratic members of ASEAN and the ARF 
are more willing to promote democracy and human rights in other member states than the ‘illiberal’ 
members (Haacke 2010: 168-9). Moreover, geopolitical considerations seem to matter in the treatment of 
fellow Southeast Asian countries. In the case of Burma/Myanmar, although the country does not appear to 
harbor ‘any clear aggressive intentions towards its neighbors’, as Petersson (2006: 570) points out, ‘the 
nation is nevertheless a source country for a number of non-traditional security threats’. ‘In the 1980s’, 
Petersson (ibid.) goes on to explain, ‘Myanmar had become the largest producer of illicit opium in the 
world’.      
While Thailand, Laos and China fear that drugs will spill across their borders from 
Burma/Myanmar, Thailand, additionally, has ‘social concerns’, worrying that the struggle between the 
Burmese military and minority groups will spill across borders and worsen its refugee problems 
(Katanyuu 2006: 828-9). To complicate matters further, many ASEAN countries’ ‘political legitimacy ... 
[repeatedly has come and continues to be] under threat from within their own borders’ (Narine 2002: 
193). Although, as will be seen, for a number of years the preferred solution had been to uphold the 
principle of non-interference in its entirety, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines, 
gradually, began to see a need to relax the principle and support national reconciliation in 
Burma/Myanmar.         
To draw Burma/Myanmar out of ‘the shadows of isolationism and into the light of globalism, 
which [he hoped] would then have a liberalizing effect on the appalling human rights situation in the 
country’ (Bunyanunda 2002: 120), Thai Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun in 1991 introduced the 
concept of ‘constructive engagement’. Upholding the ‘ASEAN way’, it stressed consensus decision-
making and non-interference. In line with what has been observed in China’s treatment of 
Burma/Myanmar, ASEAN countries, thus, decided to take a ‘soft line’ against the military junta, 
justifying their actions by suggesting that further isolation or pressure would lead to ‘even more brutal 
repression’ (ibid.: 120-123). At the same time, they hoped to appease Europe and the US, who were 
calling for the imposition of sanctions on the Burmese military (ibid.: 119-120). As Bunyanunda (2002: 
123) emphasizes, by far the most important goal, however, was ‘to counteract the influence of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC)’.    
In shielding Burma/Myanmar from outside interference, ‘constructive engagement’ largely failed 
to accomplish its goals. Human rights violations continued to go unpunished by ASEAN countries, the 
military junta remained in isolation, and China’s influence, if anything, continued to grow. In fact, several 
countries accused ASEAN of keeping the military in power in exchange for economic benefits. The US, 
for instance, much like the EU, imposed unilateral sanctions and, instead of engaging the junta, tried to 
isolate it further. To this point, in 1997, it banned all new investment in Burma/Myanmar and proposed an 
international arms embargo (ibid.: 131).         
Seeing no relief with respect to refugee flows, drug smuggling and border conflicts with 
Burma/Myanmar, Thailand, in 1998, proposed to modify ‘constructive engagement’ and replace it with 
‘flexible engagement’. Rather than for non-interference to be absolute, from now on there should be 
‘open discussion of internal developments that affected other member states’ (Katanyuu 2006: 830). As 
Haacke (1999: 581) explains, ‘flexible engagement’ was to broaden ‘the range of issues and contexts 
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traditionally defined as internal affairs in which other ASEAN governments [would] now legitimately [be 
able to] become involved’. Since only the Philippines were willing to go along with Thailand’s proposal, 
however, it never gained sufficient support. As Singapore’s former Foreign Minister stresses, it is the 
great heterogeneity of the region that makes a move away from the ‘ASEAN way’ problematic: ‘Most of 
us have diverse populations, with significant differences in race, religion and language, all of which are 
highly emotive issues. The surest and quickest way to ruin is for ASEAN countries to begin commenting 
on how each of us deals with these sensitive issues’ (Haacke 1999: 594).     
 Given that ‘flexible engagement’ could not be salvaged, Thailand then proposed a strategy of 
‘enhanced interaction’ (Petersson 2006: 571). ‘Essentially a national variant of “flexible engagement”’ 
(Haacke 1999: 598), ‘enhanced interaction’ could include ‘peer pressure or friendly advice ... if a 
domestic situation could reasonably be expected to involve deleterious ramifications for the wider region’ 
(Haacke 2010: 159; and De Flers 2010: 7). Thailand, as a direct neighbor of Burma/Myanmar, for 
instance, called for reconciliation and democratization and, time and again, implored the military junta to 
release Aung San Suu Kyi and strike up a dialogue with minority groups. The Philippines, sharing no 
borders with Burma/Myanmar and preoccupied with domestic problems themselves at the time, were not 
particularly vocal initially but, feeling sympathy for Aung San Suu Kyi, President Arroyo encouraged the 
Burmese military leaders to enter into dialogue with the political opposition (Katanyuu 2006: 836). 
Indonesia, mainly concerned with defending its position as ASEAN’s leader, also began to put pressure 
on the junta. And, to give but one further example, Singapore, in an effort to raise its international 
standing and protect its lucrative trade with Burma/Myanmar, similarly began to speak up in favor of 
political reconciliation (ibid.: 838).      
At the end of 2005, a group of Southeast Asian parliamentarians, known as the ASEAN Inter-
Parliamentary Caucus on Burma/Myanmar, called for the country to be expelled from ASEAN, unless the 
regime was to improve its human rights record (McCarthy 2008: 924). The group began to openly 
comment on the horrendous human rights violations, urging the junta to release political prisoners and to 
make progress toward democratic reform (Rueland and Bechle 2011: 7-8). To investigate the situation in 
the country further, the group also agreed to send a delegation to Burma/Myanmar (Katanyuu 2006: 839), 
and to write ‘an open letter to the heads of government of A[SEAN], China, and India … to pressure the 
Burmese authorities to deliver genuine reforms’ (Rahim 2008: 67-8).   
All these events transpired while Burma/Myanmar was scheduled to assume the ASEAN 
chairmanship for 2006/2007 (De Flers 2010: 7-8), a development which, the other ASEAN members 
recognized, had to be prevented at all cost. Not only was there international pressure
12
 in that the US and 
the EU would have boycotted meetings of the ARF, but, as Haacke (2010: 168-9) makes clear, a 
combination of economic (Thailand, Singapore, and Malaysia are important trade partners of 
Burma/Myanmar), geopolitical and reputational concerns convinced ASEAN members to toughen their 
stance. Finally, a growing desire to bring about an ASEAN Community and, further down the road, an 
ASEAN Charter, also helps to explain ASEAN’s shift in policy (ibid.: 164). Consequently, ‘[t]he 
normative shield from which Burma/Myanmar had benefitted in earlier years’—namely strict adherence 
to the principle of non-interference—‘was no longer available’ (De Flers 2010: 7).  
Although ASEAN, ultimately, succeeded in getting Burma/Myanmar to give up the 2006/2007 
Chair’s position, from then on, its relationship with the country was seriously strained until just a couple 
                                                     
12
 The US Senate had already passed a resolution ‘calling on A[SEAN] to suspend or expel the SPDC from the 
organization until it improved its human rights record’, and , as mentioned earlier, the EU had ‘extended its...travel 
ban on SPDC officials’, while both Western powers tightened their economic sanctions (Rahim 2008: 68). 
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of years ago. Increasingly frustrated with a barely noticeable pace of reform, in July 2006, ASEAN 
ministers called for ‘tangible progress that would lead to peaceful transition to democracy in the near 
future’ (ibid.: 8). In September of the following year, as a result of the military junta’s brutal crackdown 
on unarmed pro-democracy demonstrators, ASEAN expressed ‘revulsion’ (Rahim 2008). Yet, since one 
of ASEAN’s main goals is to keep Burma/Myanmar within its sphere of influence, rather than to see the 
military junta form closer ties with China, it needs to choose its policies carefully (McCarthy 2008: 935).  
 On November 20, 2007, ASEAN unveiled its Charter which entered into force on 15 December 
2008. Article 1 Section 7 states that the purpose of ASEAN is ‘[t]o strengthen democracy, enhance good 
governance and the rule of law, and to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, with 
due regard to the rights and responsibilities of the Member States’ (ASEAN 2008). The Charter was then 
followed by the launch of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) in 
Cha-am Hua Hin, Thailand, on 23 October 2009 (ASEAN 2009).    
These developments, according to Acharya (see Clifford 2011: 6), suggest that ASEAN, recently, 
has moved away from its strict interpretation of non-interference. Aside from adopting a Charter, ‘it has 
developed mechanisms for dealing with transnational challenges and regional conflict. It has come out on 
the side of political reform in Burma, when traditionally it was very hands off, and has begun a limited 
regional mechanism for human rights’ (ibid.). Or, put differently, whereas non-interference had been 
necessary during the early years of ASEAN and, by extension, the ARF, it ‘had become unworkable as an 
ongoing policy for dealing with human rights and cross-border threats’ (Katanyuu 2006: 825-6).  
 To sum up, three sources of pressure came together to urge the Burmese government to improve 
its appalling human rights situation: ‘one originating from individual members, the second coming from 
ASEAN as a group, and finally the will of the international community’ (ibid.). Clearly, Western states 
took the hardest stance vis-à-vis Burma/Myanmar, whereas regional actors pursued more of a ‘soft line’ 
in comparison (Bunyanunda 2002: 133). However, it deserves to be emphasized once more that ASEAN 
countries cannot simply be lumped into a single category—they vary in their willingness to curtail their 
freedom of action as well as their willingness to depart from a strict interpretation of the ‘ASEAN way’. 
Whereas Thailand and the Philippines, increasingly, grew eager to promote greater interventionism 
towards the Burmese military junta, more illiberal ASEAN members like Vietnam and Laos decided to 
stick to their guns.          
 As the Summary Report of the Ninth ASEAN Regional Forum Security Policy Conference in 
Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 25 May 2012 underscores, the persistent pressure placed on the Burmese 
government by ARF members to improve its human rights record appears to have paid off. Article 8 
emphasizes that, ‘[t]he successful by-election in Myanmar has sent a strong message that Myanmar is 
committed to democratic transition. The Conference [also praised] the Government of Myanmar for 
allowing international observers in the by-election ... and encouraged the lifting of all remaining sanctions 
and bans to support the ongoing progress in Myanmar’ (ARF 2012b: 2).      
To leave no doubt as to who will continue to have the say when it comes to regional security in 
the future, less than two months later, the foreign ministers of the ARF countries ‘reiterated the 
importance of the ARF as the main forum to promote peace, security and stability in [Asia-Pacific]...[and] 
underlined the role of ASEAN to continue to serve as the primary driving force within the ARF’ (ARF 
2012c: 1). At the same time, ‘[t]he Ministers welcomed Brunei Darussalam as the next Chair and 
Myanmar as the next Vice-Chair of the 20th ARF, beginning on 1 January 2013’ (ibid.: 8). 
 
Challenges to the ‘ASEAN way’ 
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Although adherence to the ‘ASEAN way’ would give China and those ASEAN members of the 
ARF who continue to be fiercely protective of their political autonomy common ground, as has been seen 
in the case of Burma/Myanmar, there have been external as well as internal dynamics that make one 
question the longevity of the ‘ASEAN way’ in its present form. International pressure, clearly, played a 
significant role in incentivizing the ASEAN members of the ARF to gradually move away from the 
normative shield that they had put in place and that they firmly adhered to for a number of years. During 
the early years of the ARF their defense of the non-interference principle and the consensus rule was so 
strong that more progressive ARF members like the EU and the US had to resort to unilateral action vis-à-
vis Burma/Myanmar to place pressure on the military junta. To the EU’s credit, it never sought to impose 
its normative views on the ASEAN countries. Recognizing that doing so would be counter-productive and 
would, potentially, make it lose any influence in the region, as Commission documents (2001: 3) 
corroborate, despite imposing sanctions on Burma/Myanmar and issuing travel bans to junta members, 
the EU, for the most part, exercised patience and sought to strengthen its ‘political and economic presence 
across the region’.      
More recently, as some of the more democratic ASEAN members of the ARF have been willing 
to move away from a very strict interpretation of the non-intervention norm toward a less stringent one 
(the move from ‘constructive engagement’ to a discussion of ‘flexible engagement’ and then ‘enhanced 
interaction’), and have been willing to make modifications to the consensus rule, there is increasing hope 
that the ARF may soon be much more than the ‘talk shop’ it has been accused of being for a large number 
of years. This, obviously, will make it much easier for the EU and other progressive ARF members like 
the US, Japan, Australia, etc., to cooperate with their partners in Southeast Asia in an effort to enhance 
human security. This was duly noted by the EU Commission in a Plan of Action to Implement the 
Nuremberg Declaration (Commission 2007: 1-2) which suggests using bilateral and multilateral fora to 
strengthen cooperation in ‘crisis management, conflict prevention, and capacity building’. As 
Bunyanunda (2002: 133) argues, ‘the most efficacious measures’ to promote human security in Asia-
Pacific are likely to incorporate both carrots and sticks.  
 
Conclusion  
 
There appears to be consensus between the EU and some of the more progressive ASEAN 
members of the ARF that they need to continue monitoring the situation in Burma/Myanmar carefully. 
What they have to avoid, if at all possible, they know, is for the country to form closer ties with China. 
Such a move could seriously offset the regional balance of power and thereby undermine everyone’s 
security. Fortunately, China’s rise in military power and growing economic presence in Burma/Myanmar 
appears to have alerted the latter’s leaders as well.  
So what might be in store for Burma/Myanmar in the years to come? Due to the combination of 
internal and external factors described above, the country recently has ‘witnessed a liberalization of the 
press, the release of political prisoners and the initiation of a political dialogue between the regime on the 
one hand and the opposition and ethnic groups on the other’ (Buente and Portela 2012: 1). Moreover, an 
independent National Human Rights Commission has been formed, new legislation has granted the right 
to strike, and the president has ‘signed peace agreements with most of the ethnic groups that have been 
fighting the central government for decades’ (ibid.: 2). However, decades of corruption, mismanagement 
and horrendous human rights abuses have left their toll, confronting the country with a huge uphill battle. 
Constitutional reforms are badly needed, along with civilian control of the military, as well as numerous 
‘social, political and economic institutions’ (International Crisis Group 2008: 25).   
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 Given that Burma/Myanmar is one of the poorest countries in the world where the government 
still battles with various ethnic groups, progress can be expected to be slow.  According to the 
International Crisis Group (2008: 26), ‘[t]he most promising path forward...is through incremental 
changes, carefully managed by a reformist, power-sharing coalition of civilian and military leaders, 
including ethnic representatives, and supported by an engaged international community’. To acknowledge 
the recent progress made and encourage further reform, several western donor countries like the US, the 
EU and Australia have begun to ‘unfreeze aid’, ‘reestablish diplomatic ties,’ and the EU decided to 
‘suspend all sanctions’ (with the exception of the arms embargo and the Generalized System of 
Preferences) (Buente and Portela 2012: 4). The fact that it suspended sanctions until 30 April 2013 (see 
European Council 2012b), rather than to lift them, however, is telling. It seems to indicate that, in the eyes 
of the EU, the recent developments in Burma/Myanmar, although promising, are not irreversible and that 
a tough road remains ahead.   
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